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Abstract: This paper investigates the conceptual overlaps between transnational return 
migration and immigration by drawing on a qualitative study of Mainland Chinese return 
migration from Canada. The paper argues that reframing return migration as a distinct type of 
immigration draws attention to the citizenship vulnerabilities experienced by “middling” 
returnees that are not privy to the preferential treatment given to highly skilled returnees. 
They become considered as “foreigners” in their homeland because they have naturalised 
elsewhere. The paper also explores the double diasporic identifications of Mainland Chinese 
returnees from Canada; it highlights the tensions and fissures manifested in secondary 
diasporas, particularly in light of China’s growing prominence in international business, 
foreign diplomacy and cultural exchanges. The paper suggests that social encounters 
marginalising such migrants in Canada are reproduced in China. The returnees navigate such 
encounters by mobilising their transnational affiliations to different national contexts. 
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Introduction 
Transnational migration is recognised widely as a defining feature of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) today and garners considerable policy and academic 
attention. One approach towards the study of migration in and out of China focuses on 
emigration, return and subsequent circulatory migration trends observed amongst 
highly skilled migrants (e.g. Zweig, 2006; Shen and Chiang, 2012). Such a focus 
corresponds to a wider literature on the “brain circulation” of a country’s diaspora as 
a means of promoting economic development in the country of origin (Saxenian, 
2006). Another approach is characterised by a new attentiveness to immigration 
trends in China. While China is seen traditionally as an emigration source country 
(Xiang, 2003), this is changing with the arrival of immigrants from a variety of 
countries that are converging on China for diverse reasons, including education, trade, 
business and work opportunities (Pieke, 2012). Chinese return migration, the focus of 
this paper, can arguably be seen as a distinct type of “immigration” in cases where the 
returnees have already naturalised in another country and given up their Chinese 
citizenship and hukou1 status in accord with a dual citizenship restriction practised by 
China (Cheng, 2005).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The hukou, or household registration system, in China can be likened to a domestic passport system 
that confers rights at the local level, such as housing and educational subsidies or jobs in government 
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This paper focuses on Mainland Chinese returnees who spent a number of years in 
Canada and obtained Canadian citizenship through skills-based immigration 
programs. Some returned to China individually but many others relocated as a family 
unit to maintain familial cohesiveness. In such family relocations, even if one member 
(usually the husband) retains Chinese citizenship, the other family members (i.e. the 
wife and children) have usually acquired Canadian citizenship before moving back to 
China. This arrangement subjects the family unit to immigration restrictions in China 
if they intend to remain in the country together. Returnees who come back to China 
on a foreign nationality status are required to apply for immigration visas to remain 
legally for an extended period of time. This reverse migration to China is distinct 
from the guiqiao, namely PRC-born Chinese returnees who went abroad but retained 
their Chinese nationality. It is also dissimilar from the long-standing category of 
huaren, referring to the progeny of the overseas Chinese that have foreign nationality 
status by descent. Studying the situation of the Mainland Chinese returnees 
contributes to conceptual advancement on the overlaps between return migration and 
immigration, two analytical categories that are normally considered apart.  
 
This paper departs from the conventional focus on highly skilled Chinese returnees 
and highlights the ambiguities of return experienced by those who belong to the 
“middling” (zhongdeng yimin) socio-economic stratum. Unlike their elite 
counterparts, middling returnees are not privy to state- and company-sponsored 
entitlements designed to entice them to return. Rather, they come back to China 
independently, often after experiencing a period of deskilling or sub-optimal job 
prospects in the country where they had sought permanent residency or citizenship. 
Conradson and Latham (2005a) introduce the conceptual category of “middling” 
migrants to highlight this spectrum of migration that has been neglected thus far as a 
result of the prevailing focus on highly or lowly skilled migrant labour. Yet middling 
migrants also deserve study because their socio-economic status impacts their social 
positioning, not only when they migrate abroad (see Nonini, 2004; Mar, 2005), but 
also during return migration. This form of return migration is qualitatively different 
from earlier trends because of the returnees’ deskilling experiences abroad and their 
foreign nationality status in China. Moreover, their legal and emotional ties to 
Canada, coupled with middling socio-economic backgrounds, result in a distinctive 
set of challenges that they and their family members face when resettling in China. As 
“new Canadians”2 now living in China, they can also be regarded as a “secondary 
diaspora” belonging to Canada in addition to identifying as part of the Chinese 
diaspora. 
 
China’s rising prominence in international business and geopolitical power engender 
renewed claims to an ascendant Chinese modernity. Several scholars argue that with 
the extraordinary rise of the economy and China’s role as a world power, the Chinese 
have growing confidence in national thought, identity and practices 3 . These 
arguments resonate with earlier claims of “Asian values” propagated by successful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that are reserved for those with local hukou status. Giving up Chinese citizenship is tantamount to 
relinquishing one’s hukou. 
2 The label, ‘new Canadians’, refers to immigrants who arrived in Canada in the last ten to fifteen years 
and have taken up Canadian permanent residency or citizenship status.  
3These range from political philosophy such as tianxia (all-under-heaven) to purportedly distinctively 
Chinese norms like xiao (filial piety), mianzi (‘face’) and guanxi (personal connections). 
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East Asian developmental states and a parallel set of scholarly views advancing the 
idea of alternative or multiple modernities (e.g. Eisenstadt, 2000; Tambiah, 2000). 
However, as Dirlik (2010, p. 30) suggests, adopting a view of multiple or alternative 
modernities does not illuminate the “proliferation of spaces and the contradictions 
they present”. Building on this scholarship, this paper considers the expression of 
distinctive modernities (anchored usually in national identities) that emerge during 
seemingly routine encounters between Mainland Chinese returnees from Canada and 
Canadian-born Canadians living in China. Their interactions result in the reproduction 
of Oriental and Occidental identity politics, despite the claims to cultural 
competencies asserted by the Mainland Chinese returnees over the Canadian-born 
Canadians.  
 
To recap, this paper aims, first, to investigate the conceptual overlaps between return 
migration and immigration by considering the situation of Mainland Chinese 
returnees who have been naturalised abroad. Reframing return as a form of 
immigration foregrounds the citizenship vulnerabilities and class fluidities 
experienced by such middling returnees. Second, the paper develops the concept of 
secondary diasporas by analysing the tensions contained within this status. We show 
how the Mainland Chinese returnees, who are now considered “new Canadians” 
living abroad, continue to experience cultural marginalisation and social exclusion in 
their interactions with the Canadian diaspora represented in China. They navigate 
such interactions by mobilising their transnational affiliations to different national 
contexts.  
 
This paper draws on in-depth interviews and participant observation methods to study 
the experiences of Mainland Chinese immigrants in Canada and return migrants to 
China4. Thirty in-depth interviews were conducted in Vancouver with Mainland 
Chinese immigrants still living in Canada, followed by another thirty interviews with 
return migrants in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. This paper focuses on the latter 
group. The interviews with returnees, carried out in Mandarin and English, explored 
their return migration motivations, experiences and future intentions. The interview 
respondents are mostly in the 30-40s age range, have tertiary qualifications and had 
accrued substantive professional or business experience in China before they migrated 
to Canada. Many of those still in Canada have experienced deskilling, and many of 
the returnees say that actual or perceived deskilling prompted their return migration. 
Of the latter group, more than half are Canadian citizens. The remainder are 
permanent residents but their family members have obtained Canadian citizenship so 
the family unit is still subject to immigration regulations in China. The interview 
extracts in this paper were translated by one of the authors. Additional participant 
observation was conducted at social events organised by Canadian associations in 
China. The reflections were recorded in a research diary after each event. 
  
The next section sets out the relationship between the literature on transnational 
migration, diaspora and middling migration. This section also discusses the 
intersection between Chinese migration and notions of modernity. Then we examine 
the motivations for Chinese return migration and the complications arising from the 
foreign nationality status of such migrants, which together with their middling socio-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The overall study included a discourse analysis of Chinese and English language policy documents 
and news reports but this will not be addressed in detail here.  
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economic backgrounds, precludes them from the preferential treatment given to 
highly skilled returnees. The next section brings into view the ties they maintain with 
Canada during their stay in China. This discussion shows that as part of a secondary 
diaspora, they are keen to contribute to Canada by sharing with other Canadians in 
China the cultural competencies associated with Chinese modernity. Yet their desire 
for recognition by other Canadians is unrealised as a result of Oriental and Occidental 
encounters that they navigate by mobilising their transnational affiliations. The 
concluding section draws together the implications of these arguments for both China 
and Canada. It also advances conceptual arguments on return as “immigration”, 
middling migration and the multiple claims to modernity asserted by secondary 
diasporas. 
 
Diaspora, middling migrants and Chinese modernity 
The evolving fields of transnational migration and diaspora studies can be likened to 
converging tributary streams. Transnational migration emphasises the ties that 
emigrants retain with their homelands even if they have immigrated to other 
countries. These ties are sustained through material and symbolic means or by way of 
return visits (Basch et al, 1994). There is a case that transnational migration should be 
distinguished analytically from “diaspora” because the latter label should be reserved 
for groups that have been compelled to leave their homelands (i.e. a “victim 
diaspora”; see Cohen, 1997). Brubaker (2005, p. 1), however, observes that the 
meanings associated with diaspora have also been stretched to “accommodate the 
various intellectual, cultural and political agendas in which its service has been 
enlisted”.  
 
Though there are distinct sets of literature on transnational migration and on diaspora 
studies (Blunt, 2007), recent work suggests that transnational migration and diaspora 
processes have become mutually constitutive in some respects. This is illustrated by 
Saxenian’s (2006) thesis that economic development is driven by the circulation of 
human capital represented in national diasporas, as members engage in recurring 
transnational migration patterns. A growing number of migrant-sending countries are 
“claiming” transnational communities as their national diasporas in order to gain 
access to their economic and political assets (Levitt, 2001; Larner, 2007; Ho, 2011). 
This paper examines the case of immigrants who have cultivated attachments to their 
host country but re-migrate subsequently to return to the country of origin. Even so 
they may still identify as the secondary diaspora of the host country they have left. 
We discuss the situation of Mainland Chinese returnees that not only claim belonging 
but also desire recognition as a secondary diaspora of Canada, while they are based in 
China.  
 
These returnees are middling migrants because they cannot be easily classified as 
highly sought-after professionals and business migrants, nor as unskilled migrants or 
refugees, who are often devalued. Our respondents usually have tertiary-level 
qualifications and professional work experience, which equips them with the skills set 
to migrate abroad through the points-based system used by immigration countries. 
They also have sufficient family income to pay the fees associated with immigration 
applications and immigrant agency services. Several studies of middling migrants in 
immigration contexts suggest such migrants are willing to take initial jobs below their 
qualifications in exchange for anticipated future social mobility (Conradson and 
Latham, 2005b; Parutis, 2011). In a study of Indian immigrants working in London’s 
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hospitality sector, Batnitzky et al (2008, p. 63) argue that some of them come from 
middle-class backgrounds in India but after migration they perform “labour 
considered inappropriate for men of their economic class (like working as a room 
attendant)”. Immigrants that move from “developing” to “developed” economies, 
including the Mainland Chinese migrants being studied in this paper, share such 
deskilling experiences, and our interest is to consider the effects of deskilling on 
return migration. Although some returnees move up the socio-economic ladder again, 
earlier deskilling continues to influence their migration trajectories. As we will see, 
the class fluidities they encounter accentuate their citizenship vulnerabilities. 
 
The relaxation of migration regulations in Mainland China from the 1970s onwards 
released emigration opportunities. Popular migrant-receiving destinations have also 
been promoting skills and business immigration for applicants who qualify through a 
points-earning or wealth-qualifying system5, such as in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. These countries utilise immigration to address economic and demographic 
objectives. A substantial number of Chinese migrants relocated and applied for 
permanent residency abroad in this way with many seeking a transition to citizenship 
status. For immigration countries, recruiting global talent contains the promise of 
sustained economic growth (Shachar, 2006; Ley, 2010). For immigrants, international 
relocation provides opportunities to develop new career directions or global business 
opportunities (Nonini, 2004) while also enabling their children to access Western-
style educational opportunities (Waters, 2002; Teo, 2007). They acquire citizenship 
rights in different countries through their financial resources and family dispersal 
arrangements (Ong, 1999).  
 
Contemporary analyses of Chinese migration nevertheless suggest that the Chinese 
state brokers transnational mobility in order to repatriate the benefits of migration.6 
Migration and development are interlinked through the transnational flows of people, 
finance, knowledge and skills transfer (Nyberg-Sørenson, 2002; Skeldon, 2008). As a 
means to this end, the Chinese state keeps in touch actively with the new Chinese 
migrants (xinyimin) who left China after 1978, which China regards as part of its 
diaspora.7 The return of overseas Chinese students and scientific or business elites is 
also strongly encouraged by various administrative units of the Chinese state and 
local government officials. The goal is to strengthen the nation’s role in the global 
business economy and promote Chinese representation in international diplomacy 
through soft ambassadorship (Zhang, 2009).  
 
In fact, Nyíri (2001) argues that Chinese migration has been socially constructed as a 
patriotic act through which transnational links strengthen the Chinese state. Notions 
of Chinese achievements and status are exported through business investments 
abroad, foreign diplomacy by state leaders, international dialogues by key 
intellectuals as well as popular culture and language exchanges (Nyíri, 2006; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The criteria include migrants’ educational qualifications, professional and business experience, 
English language proficiency, investment capital and age. 
6 Xiang (2003), however, cautions against portraying the Chinese state as a coherent apparatus because 
of a diversity of Chinese emigration cohorts and the multiple government actors involved in mediating 
migration. 
7 Apart from the xinyimin, the Chinese diaspora also refers controversially to historical waves of ethnic 
Chinese dispersed abroad such as the huaren (overseas Chinese of foreign nationalities by descent); see 
Suryadinati (1997). 
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Callahan, 2008; Barabantseva, 2009). Ordinary Chinese migrants, however, are also 
important conduits in this project. For example, Chinese development staff, managers 
and labour migrants working abroad have been instrumental in exporting 
“modernisation” to “developing” countries through development projects and trade 
(Nyíri, 2006). “Modernity” in this sense connotes a temporal dimension in that it 
highlights new economic and technical achievements; however, selective aspects of 
tradition are still mobilised in the making of this modernity. Globalisation has led to 
assertions about the supremacy of a Western program of modernity encompassing 
political, economic, social and cultural value systems and structures. In response, the 
thesis of alternative or multiple modernities critiques the Eurocentrism inherent in 
such claims (Eisenstadt, 2000; Tambiah, 2000).  
 
The current emphasis on Chinese modernity resonates with earlier claims of “Asian 
values” by East Asian developmental states during the 1990s. This claim led to 
scholarly critiques of purportedly distinctive “Asian modernities” or the “Asian turn” 
(e.g. Ang and Stratton, 1996; Chen, 1996, p. 41). Of these, Nonini and Ong’s (1996, 
pp. 13–36) exposition questioning the essentialism and ethnic chauvinism 
underpinning claims of “Asian” distinctiveness has received much academic 
attention. As Dirlik (1996) argues, Asian societies can be complicit in producing 
Orientalist discourses alongside Euro-American representations of Orientalism. In 
later writing, he adds that amidst a proliferation of claims to modernity, the 
contradictions in claims to multiple modernities have become ever more apparent 
(Dirlik, 2010, p. 29). We will develop this argument in the penultimate section, which 
considers how the Mainland Chinese returnees deploy multiple and opposing notions 
of self-Orientalism and Occidentalism.  
 
Migration ambiguities: Chinese return as “immigration”? 
Large numbers of Mainland Chinese migrants have gained entry and residency in 
Canada as economic migrants, through the skilled worker or business immigration 
programs. Mainland China was the leading source country for immigrants to Canada 
from 1998 to 2009, with an average of over 30,000 new arrivals each year 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012a). Skilled workers have to possess 
tertiary qualifications and substantial professional experience in China,8 alongside 
fulfilling other criteria such as demonstrating English language proficiency. Smaller 
numbers have arrived as business immigrants: they must manage and own an active 
business, or invest C$800,000 in Canada. These applicants tend to be mid-career 
professionals or business owners in China but they immigrate to Canada for their 
children to have a better educational environment. Some also desire to challenge 
themselves in their career development by moving to a new work setting, but studies 
indicate that their economic goals are unrealised after arriving in Canada due to 
employment difficulties and integration barriers. It is not unusual for them to 
experience substantive deskilling and they struggle to provide for their families the 
lifestyle they had anticipated.9 Immigrants’ poor performance in the labour market is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Immigrants entering Canada under the skills scheme now have to acquire a job offer prior to entry or 
show evidence of at least one year’s continuous employment in a list of selected industries (CIC, 2012b 
and 2012c). 
9 Shiye! Jianada huaren xinyimin chujing kanyou. Nanfei Huaren Bao, 22 December 2006, no page; 
Sancheng jiannada zhongguo xinyimin zao qishi. Mei Qiaobao, 16 January 2007, no page.   
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indicated in other immigration contexts using the points-based system as well, such as 
New Zealand and Australia (Liu, 2011).  
 
Chinese families in such situations are likely to embark upon an “astronaut family” 
strategy. The main breadwinner, usually the male partner, returns to seek better 
income opportunities in China while leaving behind his children to be educated in 
Canada and his spouse to take care of the children’s needs. This family dispersal 
arrangement allows some family members to fulfil the residential requirements for 
renewing their permanent residency or acquiring Canadian citizenship (Waters, 2002; 
Teo, 2007). In this sense, the Mainland Chinese migrants fit the profile of “flexible 
citizens” used to describe their Hong Kong and Taiwanese counterparts (Chiang, 
2008; Ley 2010). The challenges of transnational family separation loom large in this 
scenario and the pitfalls of transnational family life experienced by other Chinese 
migrants in Canada, such as parent-child estrangement and marital alienation, act as a 
cautionary alert to them.10 As one returnee said when reflecting on her decision to 
return to China to reunite with her husband, “Astronaut families encounter marital 
difficulties because the husband experiences loneliness when the wife and children 
are left behind in Canada.” Poor English language skills and a lack of common 
conversation topics as a result of their later socialisation into Canadian society make it 
difficult for lone parents to develop new social networks with the “locals”.11 The 
interplay of these factors results in more Mainland Chinese families deciding to 
relocate most, if not all, of the family unit back to China to maintain family 
cohesiveness and personal wellbeing. Yet by the time they return to China, some or 
all of the family members would have given up their Chinese citizenship and hukou 
status to naturalise as Canadian citizens. This presents attendant difficulties for the 
right of family members to remain in China unless they qualify for immigrant visas.  
 
An overseas Chinese newspaper reported in 2006 that the returnees from Canada are 
highly skilled and in their forties.12 It also claimed that they lived in Canada for up to 
ten years before moving back to China to start their own businesses. Our fieldwork 
(conducted in 2009–10), however, suggests that the returnees from Canada now span 
a broader age range, from the mid-thirties to mid-forties, and they may have stayed 
overseas for only two to five years before moving back to China. As returnees to the 
homeland they run their own businesses or become employed as engineers, IT 
specialists, and managerial or administrative staff. Some had suspended or scaled 
back their businesses in China to emigrate, while others experienced deskilling 
abroad, resulting in resume gaps and lapses in professional development that are 
difficult to explain to employers in China after their return.  
 
The downward social mobility they experienced in Canada means they are neither 
entitled to the preferential treatment given by the Chinese state to elite returnees nor 
treated by their companies as expatriate hires. Giving up Chinese citizenship further 
disqualifies them from the social rights that are tied to citizenship status. As one male 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These family traumas are experienced by astronaut households from Taiwan and Hong Kong too 
(Waters, 2002; Ley, 2010). 
11 The respondents use the label, “local”, to differentiate those born and bred in Canada from first-
generation immigrants. The former category refers not only to Caucasian-Canadians but also 1.5- and 
later-generation descendants of other immigrant groups including earlier cohorts of Chinese migrants.  
12 Jiahuaren huiguo chuangye jianzeng. Dongfang Shibao, 15 June 2006, no page. 
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returnee who became a Canadian citizen observed: “I no longer have Chinese 
citizenship so if my employer contributes to pensions, unemployment or medical 
insurance, and the housing fund, I am actually not entitled to them. These count for 
almost 10 per cent of my income”. Women who naturalised in Canada and then 
reunited with their husbands in China are not given working rights under their 
dependant visas. Their longer employment gap because of child care duties in Canada 
(while their husbands returned to China) results in greater difficulty finding 
employers agreeable to sponsor their working visas, thereby contributing to gendered 
barriers to labour market entry.  
 
These middling returnees from Canada are significant because of the ambiguity 
attached to their migration identities and status. They comprise a diverse category in 
terms of their occupational backgrounds, nationality status and lifestyles after return, 
but they share a background of emigration that was met with sub-optimal employment 
prospects in the country of immigration. They return to China independently rather 
than under the auspices of any government-sponsored programs. Their return 
migration to look for better paying jobs is followed by the subsequent relocation of 
most or all of the family members. Many of these returnees have been naturalised 
abroad; as foreign nationals on Chinese soil, they are required to obtain immigration 
visas to remain legally in China despite their personal histories, family ties and 
cultural affinities with the country. Mar (2005, p. 367) observes that “people from 
[the middling] strata are structurally the most anxious of subjects, insecurely poised 
between demands of material necessity and aspirations for upward social movement”. 
Our focus on the intersection between socio-economic and citizenship status deepens 
understanding of the citizenship vulnerabilities faced by middling migrants who have 
given up their birth right citizenship.  
 
The return migration of former Chinese nationals, not only from Canada but also from 
Australia, New Zealand, America and Europe, is already significant13  and will 
continue to expand numerically with the economic rise of China.14 The country’s 
immigration regime is cognisant of the scale of Chinese return migration by those 
who have naturalised abroad. Recognising the growing diversity of reasons for return, 
the Chinese immigration authorities expanded the visa categories for returning 
dependants of Chinese citizens and extended the length of stay allowed for up to two 
years (Jianada Jiayuan, 2012). Yet these policy improvements do not address the 
dissonance experienced by middling returnees whose foreign nationality status 
disqualifies them from the economic and social rights that they had once enjoyed in 
China.  
 
Despite disappointing experiences overseas, all the Mainland Chinese returnees 
interviewed claimed they will move back to Canada in the future. Their stay in China 
is a temporary sojourn motivated by the desire to earn more income for providing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For example, Ip (2011) estimates that over 300 000 former emigrants had returned to Hong Kong by 
2007 of which 35 per cent came from Canada, 24% from Australia and New Zealand, 12 per cent from 
the UK and 11 per cent from the US. These statistics are suggestive of a broader trend of Chinese 
return migration to Mainland China as well in view of the similar challenges to settlement and 
integration they face abroad like their Hong Kong counterparts. A more thorough household survey in 
Hong Kong identified at least 300,000 returnees from Canada alone (Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011). 
14 Meng xing shifen: yazhou ‘rencai’ huiliu de zhongguo jihui. Jingji Cankao Bao, 6 January 2011, no 
page.  
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their families with a better quality of life, to familiarise their children with the 
Chinese language and culture, or to care for elderly parents who would be left behind 
otherwise. They intend to re-migrate later in their life-course when their children are 
ready to enter the Canadian educational system or when they have accumulated 
enough savings to retire and enjoy their silver years in Canada. The sentiments 
expressed here corroborate the studies by Chiang (2011) and Ley (2010) on how 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong return migrants chart transnational sojourning over the 
life-course by framing Hong Kong or Taiwan as a place to work and Canada as a 
place for quality of life (including retirement). For the Mainland Chinese returnees in 
this study, future intentions to relocate to Canada result in a desire to maintain ties 
with Canada even during their stay in China.  
 
Desiring Canada in China: the secondary diaspora 
In this section, we turn our attention to the implications of the transnational 
attachments articulated by the Mainland Chinese returnees. Some have Canadian 
citizenship; others remain as permanent residents while their spouse and children 
become Canadian citizens (either by naturalisation or by birth for children born in 
Canada) then move back to China.15 Regardless of nationality status, these returnees 
claim dual belonging to China and Canada. As the broader literature on transnational 
migration attests, transnationalism need not negate attachments to the homeland nor 
the host country (Salaff et al, 2010). Migrants may experience a heightened sense of 
belonging to a particular country depending on their spatial location at that point in 
time, like the Mainland Chinese returnees discussed here who said they identify 
strongly with China while they are in Canada but their sense of belonging to Canada 
becomes salient when they are in China.  
 
Given these attachments to Canada and their intention to relocate there eventually, the 
Mainland Chinese returnees maintain an interest in developments and events related 
to Canada. They keep up with news reports on Canada and express a desire to 
participate in events organised by Canadian associations in China about which they 
are informed. For example, a married couple that returned as a family unit to China 
said: “If there are activities organised by Canadian associations we will be interested 
because we lived there for eight years. Sometimes we feel that Canada is our home. 
We bought a house there and our child was born there. We return regularly to Canada 
even now.” Attitudes of attachment and a desire to retain ties to Canada while staying 
in China emerged regularly during interviews with the Mainland Chinese returnees, 
despite their past experiences of deskilling and social marginalisation. Another 
respondent expressed similar sentiments: “I would like to keep that connection [with 
Canada] and do something for it while I am [in China] but I don’t know what… I 
lived there for several years and I liked it even though life was not easy.” For such 
Mainland Chinese returnees, Canadian legal status and personal attachments classify 
them as part of the Canadian diaspora, a label that is gaining credence in Canadian 
business and political circles (e.g. Zhang, 2007; Cao and Poy, 2011). The Mainland 
Chinese returnees, conventionally thought of as part of the Chinese diaspora, have 
double diasporic identifications. The anticipated transient nature of their stay in China 
coupled with the neglect of middling returnees by the Chinese state work together to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This is so as not to jeopardise their chances of future return to Canada; if they remained as permanent 
residents they need to renew this status every five years by residing for at least two years residency 
period in Canada. 
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reinforce their identification with Canada as a distant home to which they plan to 
return in the future.  
 
The social events organised by Canadian associations are a way for the Mainland 
Chinese returnees to sustain their overseas memories and social networks while in 
China, but they also have more pragmatic motivations. They hope to improve their 
English language competency by socialising with English-speaking Canadians in 
China. They believe that lacking proficiency in the English language not only 
contributed to employment barriers when they were in Canada, but also caused 
difficulty in interacting with English-speaking Canadians. Besides that, they worry 
that being immersed once again in a predominantly Mandarin-speaking society could 
compromise their ability to use their English language skills when they move back to 
Canada. As another returnee expressed:  
I still feel that I am Canadian. I will attend activities to get to know people and 
practise my English. I haven’t spoken English for a long time. If I go on like 
this I won’t know how to speak English anymore. I still return to Canada 
every year and I pay my taxes as a Canadian citizen. It is also for the sake of 
my child [who is a Canadian citizen].  
This interview extract reveals the multiple benefits this respondent anticipated in 
attending social functions organised by the Canadian associations: buttressing 
personal identity, providing a reference point for a Canadian child, maintaining 
language fluency, and establishing social networks with other Canadians. They seek 
contact with native English-speaking Canadians who are seen to embody not only 
fluent language skills but also cultural competencies as “real Canadians” (a term used 
frequently by returnees), however loosely this is defined.  
 
The activities organised by Canadian associations in China are also expected to 
provide a platform for more equal interaction between the Mainland Chinese 
returnees and the native-born Canadians. As this returnee puts it: “we all came from 
Canada to China…. Whether you are a Caucasian or Asian, you are in China to live 
and work so everyone can share their experiences, there is a common topic and you 
can all get to know one another.” In other words, there is a desire for mutual learning 
through the shared experiences of traversing geographical boundaries (Tu, 2002). 
This is because they are no longer “guests” as they were in Canada but now “hosts” in 
China with cultural knowledge, professional connections and social networks that can 
be shared with the Canadians they meet. As mobility and geographical context re-
define the social relations of hospitality (Molz and Gibson, 2007), they hope that the 
conventional host-guest division that had penalised them in Canada can be corrected 
in China. 
 
The Mainland Chinese returnees are keen to contribute to Canada during their stay in 
China. As one returnee puts it, they believe they can “be a bridge between Canada and 
China”. This way of thinking is explained by another respondent who said:  
Canadian companies have to utilise people who know how to and can bridge 
both cultures. Returnees know the competitors, the customers and how to enter 
the Chinese market. These Canadian companies can use returnees as 
consultants and this would benefit both parties but the companies would 
benefit more.  
The metaphor of a “bridge” is a recurring theme in the interviews and suggests that 
there are cultural differences that the Mainland Chinese returnees from Canada 
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believe they can help mediate. For example, another returnee who started a business 
after relocating to China explained the difference between the “Canadian way” and 
the “Chinese way” of doing business:  
The Canadians are more rigid in the way they do things. They will follow 
protocols and rules whereas the Chinese rely on intuition most of the time. 
The Chinese also prioritise a sense of community, which is different from 
Canada…. Canadian business people [are] also less proactive compared to the 
Chinese.  
Such attitudes, invoking self-Orientalising and Occidental mobilisations of identity, 
were repeated during other interviews. 
 
Return migration and co-presence with other Canadians in China provide new 
opportunities for the Mainland Chinese returnees to assert an equal, or even superior, 
right to cultural knowledge and social space as well as affirm their national 
contributions to Canada. Yet these claims of Chinese cultural competencies might be 
read as performances of self-essentialising identities. As Yen and Santos (2009, p. 
297) argue, the “Orient itself participates in its construction, reinforcement and 
circulation”. In the process, the returnees also impose Occidental views constructed of 
the Western “other” (Bonnett, 2005) as indicated in the earlier comparison between 
the “Canadian way” and the “Chinese way” of doing business. Mainland Chinese 
returnees are complicit in perpetuating selective stereotypes of cultural difference in 
their quest to stake a claim to complementary knowledge, but navigating putative 
cultural differences gives them a comparative advantage. As we will see in the next 
section, however, any anticipated social capital asset may be compromised through 
tensions manifested in spaces of co-presence, including the events organised by 
Canadian associations in China.  
 
Navigating Occidental and Orientalist encounters in China 
Despite the positive tone portrayed in the preceding discussion, discomforts and 
social tensions are apparent in spaces of co-presence shared by different types of 
Canadians in China. The Canadian associations we studied in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangdong mainly cater to university alumni and professional networks. They also 
cultivate links with Canadian consulates and chambers of commerce, but the majority 
of the Mainland Chinese returnees interviewed were unaware of the activities offered 
by these associations. Most returnees received their education in China thus they are 
not privy to these Canadian educational networks. The minority of respondents who 
participated in associational life had mixed feelings about these events.  
 
The events we observed in the three cities showed over-representation by Caucasian-
Canadians and later-generation Chinese-Canadians, and a smaller share of Mainland 
Chinese-Canadians. One of these events was organised by an association that 
promoted social networking amongst Canadians in China. A crowd of about thirty 
people mingled beside the wine and cheese buffet table in the function room that 
evening. The sound of polite chatter was accompanied by live music playing softly in 
the background. Amidst this, we noticed a group of six Mainland Chinese in a corner 
of the room, isolated socially from the rest of the guests. We approached them and 
found that two had returned from Canada and the rest were their guests. As the 
conversation warmed up, one of the returnees told us that they found the event had 
several small cliques that made it awkward for them to join the conversations. Few of 
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the other attendees initiated conversation with them; the barriers to socialising they 
found in Canada have been replicated in China.  
 
The rising prominence of China in international business, foreign relations and 
cultural prowess results in growing confidence towards a Chinese modernity that, as 
indicated in the previous section, is expressed self-consciously by the Mainland 
Chinese returnees. They advance knowledge of Chinese business and cultural 
competencies, which puts them in a position to convey these to other Canadians in 
China. However, their aspirations for social and cultural recognition are unmet 
because, as middling returnees of Chinese ethnicity, few of them are likely to be 
recognised by the Canadian associations as bearers of specialised knowledge. Even in 
China the alleged superiority of Western knowledge prevails. For instance, a 
successful entrepreneur in the cultural industry told us that he felt slighted by a 
particular Canadian association because, instead of inviting him to its events, the 
organisers regularly invite his assistant who is a Caucasian-Canadian. In this manner 
the loss of face he suffered in Canada is repeated in his home country, an unwelcome 
affront indeed.  
 
Another returnee who works in a senior position for a marketing firm in China 
remarked:  
The returnees have experiences in Canada and China. They see Canadian 
products as their own national products and can promote them in China. But 
there is little of that taking place now in the resource or tourism industry. I am 
in marketing and I understand the Chinese market and Canada’s attractions. I 
feel that its branding has potential but… every product has to go through a 
process of localisation. For example, I have seen the marketing strategy of a 
Canadian fashion apparel brand and they wish to expand globally but they 
have not considered the Chinese market.  
In the view of this respondent, returnees like herself have a distinct advantage in that 
they are familiar with both China and Canada, but their expertise is not called upon by 
their Canadian counterparts that still prefer “Western” cultural intermediaries. 
 
The preference for foreign speakers, perceived by the Mainland Chinese returnees as 
lacking culturally informed knowledge of China, results in other social tensions. We 
observed another event organised for an American business professor who had been 
invited to promote his book at a panel discussion. He told the audience, a mix of 
Chinese and Caucasian attendees, that foreigners can set the direction of change in 
Chinese society. He addressed topics ranging from human rights to business ethics 
and Internet freedom insensitively, and expressed criticism towards those adopting the 
guanxi way (using personal connections) to do business in China. At the end of his 
talk there was a charged atmosphere in the room.  
 
One of the Chinese panellists, who told the audience she grew up in China but had 
been educated abroad and works for a multinational company, challenged the 
presentation for “its unfair view towards China”. During the Q&A session, another 
Chinese woman stood up and introduced herself as a representative from another 
country’s chamber of commerce. In a feisty manner she said “the guanxi way has 
been exaggerated by journalists and professors and it is important everywhere, not 
only in China”. She concluded by stating that the professor had done a poor job of 
promoting his book and she would not be buying it. The audience responded with 
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sustained applause. Clearly, the exchange at this talk had offended the cultural 
sensibilities of the Chinese and at least some of the Caucasians in the audience. Yet 
the above intervention also suggests that common ground is sought between the East 
and West by way of attempts to frame guanxi relations in an international (not just a 
Sino-centric) business culture.  
 
In a transnational world where migrants have multiple international business, 
professional and social ties, the claims to modernity made by the Mainland Chinese 
returnees are shaped in more complex ways than an East/West reference frame. 
Nonini and Ong (1996) observe that the subjectivities of Chinese transnationals are 
multiply constituted by the many directions they face, and notably between Asia and 
the West. Nonini and Ong, however, stop short of considering the ways in which the 
“West” has multiple sites of creation as well (Bonnett, 2005, p. 508). This point is 
exemplified by the deliberations of the Mainland Chinese returnees on how their ties 
with Canada are conditioned by their interactions with counterparts from other 
Western countries represented in China. For instance, one Chinese businessman who 
used to attend activities by the Canadian associations commented during the 
interview:  
I feel that [the Canadian] activities do not attract mainstream entrepreneurs. 
They only have small businesses participating. I have stronger networks in 
China than what they can access. The US [association] is better so I would 
rather attend their activities.... I think the US embassy gives them a lot of 
support. But the Canadian one always makes you pay money. Why should I 
when I get very little out of it? They should identify influential persons in the 
circle in China and support them. These people have influence and can bring 
other influential people along. Instead the association only finds foreigners or 
other Caucasians. You are in China yet you still invite only Caucasians to talk 
about the China market. It is weird.  
 
Returnees, like the respondent above, identify with not only China or Canada; they 
also have former educational affiliations and current business, professional or social 
ties with other countries in North America, Australasia and Europe. The above 
interview extract highlights two key points: first, seemingly trivial issues, such as the 
costs of participation, are aggravated by deep-seated perceptions of cultural prejudice 
and marginalisation by the Canadian associations in China. These sentiments deter 
closer affiliation with those representatives of Canadian society in China. Second, the 
response also demonstrates the manner in which the Mainland Chinese returnees from 
Canada navigate national affiliations other than those they have with China and 
Canada. Transnational migrants claim multiple cultural, social and economic ties that 
are shaped by their perceptions of Oriental and Occidental identities and modernities.  
 
The preceding examples underline a contradictory desire by the Mainland Chinese 
returnees to identify the common ground that “Western” cultural systems have with 
Chinese societal structures, while simultaneously foregrounding their rights to 
cultural competencies as “insiders” in China. This is suggested in the discussion on 
how they position themselves as intermediaries that recognise the nuances of Chinese 
cultural systems but are able to frame them in a manner that will bridge cultural gaps 
with the “West”. Yet their transnational identities and affiliations make them prone to 
differentiate between various types of “Western” (in this case North American) 
modernities and affiliate themselves accordingly. Inasmuch as states and institutions 
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may appropriate narratives of modernity or mobilise diasporic belonging and 
contributions for national gains, migrants can affirm and undermine these elite-
mobilised narratives selectively from their own experiences and goals.  
 
The replication of social marginalisation in China as the Mainland Chinese returnees 
had experienced previously in Canada recreates an unwelcome social hierarchy in 
which they are always disadvantaged outsiders. In Canada their economic and cultural 
competencies had been devalued, resulting in integration barriers. Even after 
returning to China, they feel subjected to alleged “Western” superiority during their 
interactions with Canadians in China. To mitigate such social encounters, they 
advance claims of modernity drawn from their multiple transnational affiliations 
instead. While one view may construe these Chinese transnationalists as opportunistic 
capitalists, a more nuanced interpretation would be to foreground the social and 
cultural exchanges they encounter in embedded national contexts, contexts that are 
also transferred disturbingly from North America to China during re-migration. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper argued for the importance of studying the middling stratum of return 
migrants because of the class fluidities they experience, such as the way their labour 
market outcomes in China are shaped by earlier deskilling experiences in Canada. We 
also suggest that in cases where returnees have obtained a foreign nationality their 
return should be re-framed as a type of immigration. This conceptual re-definition 
highlights the overlaps between return migration and immigration while also drawing 
out the vulnerabilities experienced by such returnees because of their new legal status 
and the dissonance they encounter despite claims to cultural affinities with China. 
Further research studying middling return migration systematically, by occupation 
type or the countries from which they re-migrated, will help advance knowledge on 
this phenomenon, such as whether the brain circulation of the Chinese diaspora 
indeed benefits the Chinese economy or whether their legal, material and emotional 
ties abroad will result in sustained transnational trajectories. The gendered contour of 
return migration is also a productive potential research direction as suggested earlier 
in this paper.  
 
Our research also showed that the Mainland Chinese returnees in this study identify 
with Canada and, as part of a secondary diaspora belonging to Canada, they desire to 
contribute to Canadian society as it is represented in China. To do so they advance 
their cultural knowledge of Chinese modernity, stressing its importance in the light of 
China’s growing prominence in the international business, foreign diplomacy and 
cultural arena. Fissures and tensions are nevertheless apparent in the way they 
continue to experience social marginalisation during interactions with other 
Canadians in China, for we see that awkward Occidental and Orientalist encounters 
are transferred geographically from one continental context to another. Their tactics 
for navigating such encounters include situating aspects of Chinese modernity as 
universal norms and mobilising transnational affiliations to align themselves with 
other Western national affiliations in China.  
 
Analyses such as this contribute towards recent calls by scholars such as Bonnett 
(2005) and Dirlik (2010) to do more than acknowledge alternative or multiple 
modernities, and instead account for the power relations that implicate cultural 
processes of domination, co-option, subversion and resistance. Our dual-sited focus 
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on transnational links between China and Canada shows that “sticky” geographical 
contexts and the institutional structures of nation-states, such as immigration 
regulations, citizenship regimes and labour market outcomes, mutually implicate one 
another to produce the power asymmetries underpinning migrant subjectivities, 
family life and life-course trajectories. 
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